We study a sequential two-stage Tullock contest with two asymmetric players. The players compete for two prizes; the player with the highest e¤ort in the …rst stage wins the secondary prize while the player with the highest total e¤ort in both stages wins the …rst prize. Both players have the same cost functions where the marginal cost in the …rst stage is higher than in the second one. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of this contest and reveal a paradoxical behavior such that the players' utilities increase in their marginal e¤ort cost.
Introduction
A war might have several battles in which the winner is not necessarily the winner of the war. A war with several battles is an example of a multi-stage contest in which one of the contestants wins the …rst (main) prize at the end of the contest but each of the other contestants including the winner of the …rst prize may win secondary prizes during the contest. We can …nd several such real-life contests with secondary prizes. A well-known example of a contest with secondary prizes is the Tour de France which is an annual multi-stage bicycle race. In this contest, the rider with the lowest aggregate time over all the stages wins the …rst prize (the prize for the general classi…cation). However, the rider who wins the race containing climbs wins a secondary prize (the prize for the mountain classi…cation) and there are also other secondary prizes (the prizes for the minor classi…cations). Another example is a political race or an election in which a party Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel. Email: asa…lu@post.bgu.ac.il y Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel. Email: anersela@bgu.ac.il member competes to be the party's candidate for head of government (…rst prize) and also competes to be elected together with his party as part of the government In this paper, we study a two-stage Tullock contest with two contestants in which a contestant who exerts a higher total e¤ort over the two stages has a higher probability to win the …rst prize, while a contestant who exerts a higher e¤ort in the …rst stage only, has a higher probability to win the secondary prize. 1 In order that the contestants'decision about the e¤ort allocation over the two stages be non-trivial we assume that the contestants'marginal e¤ort cost in the …rst stage is higher than in the second one. 2 Note that if the relation between the contestants'e¤ort cost in both stage is lower in the …rst stage than in the second one, then both contestants will allocate e¤orts in the …rst stage only since an e¤ort in the …rst stage yields winning the …rst and secondary prizes while an e¤ort in the second stage yields winning the …rst prize only. 3 We assume that the contestants are asymmetric, namely, they have di¤erent values of winning for di¤erent secondary prizes, but they have the same value for the …rst prize. In that case, we have three forms of a subgame perfect equilibrium: 1. Both contestants are active in both stages, 2. both contestants are active in the …rst stage, 3. one contestant is active in both stages and the other is active in the …rst one only.
We study only the two cases in which both contestants are active in both stages or both contestants are active in the …rst one, since the analysis of these cases is su¢ cient for arriving at conclusions. We obtain that the contestants'expected payo¤s are not the same when they are both active in both stages as when they are both active in the …rst stage only. We compare these expected payo¤s and …nd a paradoxical result according to which both contestants'expected payo¤s are higher when they are active in both stages than when they are active in the …rst stage only although their marginal e¤ort costs are higher when they both are active in both stages. In other words, both contestants' expected payo¤s are higher when they have higher (marginal) e¤ort costs. 1 The present paper shows only one way of allocating two asymmetric prizes in a Tullock contest. In the literature, there are several ways to allocate k prizes in such a contest (see, for example, Berry 1993, and Clark and Riis 1996, 1998). 2 There is much evidence that, as in our model, contestants strategically allocate their resources in multi-stage contests (see, The maximization problem of contestant 1 in the second stage is
Similarly, the maximization problem of contestant 2 is
By symmetry of the contestants in the second stage, we have, x 1 + y 1 = x 2 + y 2 , and then from (1) we obtain
Thus, the contestants'equilibrium strategies in the second stage are
The necessary conditions that both contestants exert e¤orts in the second stage are x i < wr 4 ; i = 1; 2: Then, we obtain that
The contestants'expected payo¤s in the second stage are
The …rst stage
The maximization problem of contestant 1 in the …rst stage is
and the maximization problem of contestant 2 is
The F.O.C. are
Thus, the contestants'equilibrium strategies in the …rst stage are
The necessary and su¢ cient conditions that y i > 0; i = 1; 2 are
wr 4
Thus, the subgame perfect equilibrium in which both contestants exert e¤orts in both stages exists if
The contestants'expected payo¤s are then
Proposition 1 In the asymmetric two-stage Tullock contest if the ratio of the contestants' marginal e¤ ort costs in the …rst and second stages is larger than or equal to maxf1 +
there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which both contestants are active in both stages.
In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the asymmetric two-stage Tullock contest when both contestants are active in both stages their expected payo¤s do not depend on the ratio of the contestants'marginal e¤ort costs, and is equal to their total expected payo¤s in the two independent one-stage Tullock contests: one with the symmetric …rst prize and the second with the asymmetric secondary ones.
Case B:
The contestants are active only in the …rst stage
The second stage
In this case, both contestants are not active in the second stage, namely, y i = 0; i = 1; 2 . In the following we …nd the necessary condition that contestant 1 does not want to exert a positive e¤ort in the second stage given that contestant 2 exerts an e¤ort only in the …rst stage.
The maximization problem of contestant 1 in the second stage when contestant 2 does not exert any e¤ort in that stage is
The F.O.C. is
and the F.O.C. is
Thus, by symmetry of the contestants in the second stage, we have x 1 + y 1 = x 2 + y 2 . Note that
The last inequality holds since (x 2 ) < (x 1 + y 1 ): Therefore, we obtain that Lemma 1 In the asymmetric two-stage Tullock contest, su¢ cient conditions that both contestants do not exert e¤ orts in the second stage are
where x 1 and x 2 are the contestants' equilibrium e¤ orts in the …rst stage.
The …rst stage
Given that the contestants are active in the …rst stage only, the maximization problem of contestant 1 in the …rst stage is
The su¢ cient conditions that y i = 0; i = 1; 2 in the second stage are
Thus, a subgame perfect equilibrium in which both contestants exert e¤ort in the …rst stage only satis…es i¤
The contestants'expected payo¤s are
Proposition 2 In the asymmetric two-stage Tullock contest if the ratio of the contestants' marginal e¤ ort costs in the …rst and second stages is smaller than or equal to minf In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the asymmetric two-stage Tullock contest when both contestants are active in the …rst stage only, their expected payo¤s do not depend on the ratio of the marginal costs in both stages, and is the same as their expected payo¤ in the one-stage Tullock contest with a prize that is equal to the sum of the …rst and the secondary prizes.
A comparison of the contestants'expected payo¤s
If the ratio of the contestants'marginal e¤ort costs in the …rst and second stages satis…es > maxf 
Thus, we obtain that the order of the critical values of the marginal e¤ort costs is
Hence, when contestants are asymmetric such that v 1 > v 2 , if the ratio of the contestants'marginal e¤ort costs in the …rst and second stages satis…es > ; we obtain that We can now explain the above paradox that occurs in our two-stage Tullock contest according to which higher e¤ort costs yield higher expected payo¤s for the contestants as follows. By Propositions 1 and 2, when the ratio of the contestants' marginal e¤ort costs in both stages is relatively small, the contestants actually compete in a one-stage contest in which the winner wins a prize that is equal to the sum of the …rst and the secondary prizes. On the other hand, when the ratio of the contestants'marginal e¤ort costs is relatively high, the contestants actually compete in two separate contests, one with the …rst prize and the second with the secondary one. In that case, it could be that one contestant wins both prizes but also that each of the contestants wins one of the prizes. Then, according to Proposition 3, asymmetric contestants might prefer to compete for several prizes separately and not compete for a single prize in a winner-take-all contest although the value of the single prize in the winner-take-all contest is higher than the sum of the prizes in the separate two contests.
